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Some ideas for the integration of neurophenomenology and affective neuroscience 
 
 
 
Structured abstract 
 
Context • Affective neuroscience has not developed first-person methods for the generation of 
first-person data. This neglect is problematic, because emotion experience is a central 
dimension of affectivity. 
Problem • I propose that augmenting affective neuroscience with a neurophenomenological 
method can help address long-standing questions in emotion theory, such as: Do different 
emotions come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity? How do emotion 
experience, bodily feelings, and brain and bodily activity relate to one another?  
Method • This paper is theoretical. It advances ideas for integrating neurophenomenology and 
affective neuroscience, and explains how this integration would make progress on the above 
questions. 
Results • An integrated “affective neuro-physio-phenomenology” may help scientists 
understand whether discrete emotion categories come in different experiential varieties, 
which would in turn help interpret concomitant brain and bodily activity. It may also help 
investigate the bodily nature of emotion experience, including how experience relates to 
actual brain and bodily activity. 
 Implications • If put into practice, the ideas advanced here would enrich the scientific study 
of emotion experience, and more generally further our understanding of the relationship of 
consciousness and physical activity. The paper is speculative and its ideas need to be 
implemented to bear fruit.   
Constructivist content • This paper argues in favour of the neurophenomenological method 
which is an offshoot of enactivism. 
Key words • neurophenomenology, affective neuroscience, emotion experience, bodily 
feelings 
Paper type • Conceptual inquiry 
Background(s) • Philosophy, cognitive science, affective science.   
Perspective • Enactive cognitive science 
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1 Generating first-person data in the neurophenomenological approach 
 
In Varela’s original characterization (Varela 1996), neurophenomenology is a method for the 
integration of third-person and first-person data, where the former refer to data about brain 
and bodily activity,1 and the latter to data about consciousness or lived experience. Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch (1991)  had already emphasized the need to develop appropriate methods 
for the study of consciousness, including the cultivation of first-person practices for the 
collection of first-person data. Varela (1996) continued this project, adding that “meaningful 
bridges” need to be created between first- and third-person data, in particular that first- and 
third-person data need to “constrain” one another. More precisely, first-person data should be 
collected to shed meaning on, or interpret, physical activity, whereas third-person data should 
in turn be used to guide experiential reports, and to help subjects discover, and report on, 
previously unnoted aspects of their experience. 
 Varela’s initial suggestions have been taken up by his colleagues and students, and a 
few explicitly neurophenomenological experiments have been conducted so far (Lutz et al. 
2002; Cosmelli et al. 2004; Petitmengin, Navarro & Le Van Quyen 2007; Christoff et al. 
2009. A comprehensive overview and discussion of neurophenomenology can be found in 
Thompson 2007; see also Thompson, Lutz & Cosmelli 2005). Relative to more mainstream 
cognitive-neuroscientific works, these studies make a more extensive and often more 
sophisticated use of first- as well as second-person methods for the exploration of lived 
experience and the generation of first-person data (primarily via self-reports). This is indeed 
what characterizes them as neuro-phenomenological studies 
 In neurophenomenology, first-person methods are often used to stabilize and observe 
one’s own experience, in the aim of revealing its structure. Importantly, in a 
neurophenomenological study participants are invited to describe their experience by 
adopting a passive-observational stance—a “bare attention” or “receptive openness,” as 
Thompson, Lutz & Cosmelli (2005) call it, rather than an inquisitive, judgmental, and 
actively discriminating form of attention. This stance is akin to what several Eastern 
meditative techniques also recommend, namely the cultivation of a mental attitude that 
merely “takes note” of what the subject feels, thinks, desires, and so on, without judging, 
                                                
1 I use the term “body” to refer to the organism “minus” the brain (and, relatedly, I use the 
term “organism” to refer to the brain and body together). 
 4 
rejecting or praising (Wallace 1999; Depraz, Varela & Vermersch 2003). Western clinical 
practices inspired by these techniques, such as Mindfulness Based Cognitive Therapy, 
similarly invite subjects merely to take note of their experiences, rather than overly analyzing 
them and/or ruminating over them (see e.g. Segal, Williams & Teasdale 2001).2  
 A detailed description of how to cultivate such a receptive and open self-observational 
stance that is highly relevant for a neurophenomenological approach has been provided by 
Depraz, Varela & Vermersch (2003). They describe three “interrelated acts” of suspension, 
redirection and letting go. What needs to be suspended is one’s naïve and immersed attention 
in the contents or objects of experience (the “what” of experience). Attention needs to be 
redirected toward the “how” of experience, i.e. the act of experiencing itself, in its various 
dimensions; or, to use a Husserlian terminology, attention needs to be directed from the 
“noematic” pole of experience (the object as it is intended) to the “noetic” one, namely to the 
act itself of intending an object. Thus for example when exploring one’s fear of a certain 
situation, the focus should be redirected from the feared object, to how one experiences the 
fear—such as its intensity, its bodily character or its hedonic tone. Likewise when observing 
an instance of intense joy, one should redirect attention to the way one “lives through” the 
joy—perhaps as a sense of “expansion,” accompanied by the desire to jump or throw one’s 
arms up in the air. Throughout this process, the subject needs to let her experience “go,” 
namely let it arise and unfold “as it is,” without interfering by judging, analyzing, or trying to 
find a cause for it.  
 In addition to first-person methods, neurophenomenology also calls for the 
development of second-person methods, namely methods that involve an interaction between 
the self-observing subject and an interviewer, again in the aim of exploring the structure of 
human lived experience and generating first-person data. One task of the interviewer is to 
guide the self-observing process with an open and receptive attitude that encourages the 
subject to report her experiences on her own terms. The method known as the explicitation 
interview for example (Vermersch 1994; Petitmengin-Peugeot 1999) begins with broad, open 
questions that invite the subject to observe and report in her own words her current or just-
lived experience, without the imposition of pre-established theoretical assumptions on the part 
of the experimenter. Another task of the interviewer is to help the subject “re-live” and “slow 
                                                
2 In a recent book that also calls for the integration of first- and third-person methods, Price & 
Barrell (2012: 51) similarly distinguish between “simply noticing” or “observing” one’s own 
experience, and “interpreting, analizing, or ruminating.” 
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down” the experience under investigation, in case there are aspects of it that may not have 
been noted the first time they were observed. A working hypothesis of this approach is that it 
can reveal dimensions of experience that would not be detected if subjects were constrained 
with more specific questions.3 It requires however that interviewers refrain from imposing 
their own views, and rather adopt a stance of non-judgmental curiosity, interest and 
empathetic understanding. A further task of the interviewer is to help produce, at the end of 
the interview, a synthetic representation of the structure and dimensions of the observed 
experience, namely a short description capturing its most salient or characteristic features. 
 In both first- and second-person methods, training plays an important role. 
Neurophenomenology assumes that naïve, untrained subjects who are not used to observing 
and reporting their experience are unlikely to provide good first-person data. As Husserl 
himself already noted, our “natural attitude” (as opposed to a reflective phenomenological 
one) is one of immersion in the world, rather than focus on the structures of experience. 
Indeed as it is often pointed out in accounts of second-person approaches to experience (not 
just in neurophenomenology but also for example psychotherapy), naïve subjects find it 
difficult to switch from their everyday stance of immersion in the world to considering and 
observing experience itself. Often they do not know how to describe an experience (indeed 
they are not even sure what an experience is), are reluctant to do so, do not distinguish 
                                                
3 This openness on the part of the questioner, and the invitation to let the reports be guided by 
the subject as much as possible, is a fundamental tenet of qualitative approaches in 
psychology, like Grounded Theory, Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis, Narrative 
Psychology, Discourse Analysis and others (see papers in Smith 2008). These approaches 
differ in method, but they all invite the experimenters to let their analyses and interpretations 
be guided as much as possible by what subjects report. Even if one denies that it is possible to 
adopt a theory-free stance towards experiential reports, there is a difference between looking 
for specific dimensions (e.g. pleasantness, bodily sensations, loss of control) when one reads 
or listens to a report, and looking for dimensions that the report itself presents as particularly 
salient or relevant. This difference is akin to the one between the mainstream neuropsychiatric 
approach, which looks for specific “experiential symptoms” (hallucinations, delusions etc.) in 
order to classify a mental disorder, and phenomenological psychopathology, which rather 
aims to describe and analyse the patient’s experience on the basis of what the patient says (see 
Colombetti, 2013, for a comparison between neurophenomenology and phenomenological 
psychopathology). 
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between observing the experience and commenting on what the experience should be, or what 
could have caused it, or how it fits with one’s self-image; more generally they cannot bracket 
their presuppositions and do not observe their experience skilfully (see Gendlin 1996; 
Hurlburt 2009). Training subjects is important to overcome these difficulties and to provide 
subjects with self-observational skills that can generate better first-person data. In addition, 
training of the kind advocated in neurophenomenology aims to improve concentration, to 
enable subjects to observe specific aspects of their experience without being too distracted by 
interfering mental activity (including passing thoughts, sensations and evaluations), and to 
distinguish between aspects of the experience and comments or judgments about it. In the 
absence of training, self-observation is likely to generate inconsistent reports and thus 
unreliable data. 
 Training is also advocated for second-person methods, in particular the interviewer 
herself needs to learn to bracket her presuppositions so as to adopt an attitude of open 
curiosity. Useful indications about the attitude that interviewers should take when guiding 
others in the exploration of their experience can be found in the literature of Mindfulness 
Based Cognitive Therapy. Notably Crane (2009) emphasizes non-judgmental openness, 
kindness and patience, as well as a “beginner’s mind” attitude that explores the qualities of 
the other’s experiences with renewed interest and acceptance of whatever arises. She stresses 
that the interviewer should encourage participants to develop trust in their capacity to report 
their experiences, and to cultivate an attitude of non-striving and dwelling in the present 
moment.4  
 
2 The place of self-observation and self-reports in affective neuroscience 
 
None of these methods for the exploration of lived experience is typically adopted in the 
current neuroscientific approach to emotion (also known as “affective neuroscience”; see 
Davidson et al. 2003).5 In spite of impressive technological progress in neuroimaging and 
                                                
4 A common worry here is that training subjects distorts their experience, and transforms it 
into something else. For replies to this worry see Zahavi (2005); Thompson, Lutz & Cosmelli 
(2005); Petitmengin & Bitbol (2009). 
5 The term “affective neuroscience” is also associated with the work of Jaak Panksepp. 
Panksepp in particular has defended the existence of a set of primary affective systems in the 
mammalian brain, which he argues are also responsible for emotional feelings (see for 
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psychophysiological measurements, affective neuroscience still exhibits a general lack of trust 
in self-reports. The affective-neuroscientific approach usually studies emotions in the form of 
neural, physiological and/or behavioral responses to a range of emotional stimuli (e.g. 
pictures, video clips, music, scenarios). Reliance on self-reports is very cautious and 
minimized, in various senses. First, when self-reports are collected, this is typically done at 
the end of the experimental manipulation, mainly as a form of control, and always together 
with other third-person measures, considered more reliable because “objective.” There is no 
sense here in which first-person data are used from the beginning to organize and analyze 
third-person data. Second, first-person data are typically obtained with questionnaires that ask 
subjects to rate their emotion experiences or feelings on some numerical scale. No method is 
usually elaborated or at least suggested for collecting and analyzing detailed qualitative data, 
and for using these data to shed light onto neural and physiological activity. Experience in 
these studies is thus reported only in a minimal way; qualitative methods are not used  to 
provide fine-grained descriptions of it. Third, the scales in question are usually not produced 
by the experimenter, but rather borrowed from previous studies and/or standard 
questionnaires. These scales thus reflect previous theoretical assumptions about the nature of 
emotion experience (such as that it varies along the two dimensions of intensity and valence, 
for example), and subjects are not given the possibility to describe their feelings in their own 
words. The Differential Emotion Scale (DES, Izard 1972), for instance, asks subjects to rate 
on a scale from 1 to 5 (from very slightly or not at all, to very strongly) how happy, sad, 
angry, scared etc. they feel. This scale assumes that emotions come in irreducible distinctive 
qualities and does not allow to explore constitutive dimensions of affects (it does not allow to 
explore how it feels to be angry, scared, and so on). Fourth, sometimes standard clinical scales 
are used that are not designed to capture dimensions of experience while it is lived—such as 
the Hamilton Anxiety Scale (Hamilton 1995), the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck & Steer 
1993), and the “body perception questionnaire” (Porges 1993). These scales ask about general 
traits, habits, and conditions, and not about the character of presently lived feelings.  
                                                                                                                                                   
example Panksepp 1998, 2005). Panksepp certainly believes that neuroscientists should pay 
more attention to emotion experience, and not just in humans. However to the best of my 
knowledge his work has focused mainly on the study of animal brains, and not on the 
development of first- and second-person methods for the study of emotion experience in 
human subjects. 
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 Although the situation is gradually changing (see Colombetti, in press, for more 
details), it is still fair to say that affective neuroscience has so far hardly been affected by the 
recent wave of renewed interest in first- and second-person methods for the study of 
consciousness (see for example Varela & Shear 1999; Velmans 2000; Jack & Roepstorff 
2003; 2004; Petitmengin 2009; Price & Barrell 2012). At the moment, it wavers between 
recognition of the need to ask subjects how they feel (see the use of questionnaires mentioned 
above), and fear to rely “too much” on their reports. In most cases, the latter prevails and 
emotion experience is sidestepped as a consequence. I think it is fair to say that Davidson et 
al.’s (2003) chapter in the Handbook of Affective Sciences is still paradigmatic of this attitude. 
The authors initially acknowledge that it is “tempting and often important to obtain measures 
of subjects’ conscious experience of the contents of their emotional states and traits” (p. 9), 
but conscious experience quickly disappears from their discussion. The chapter overviews 
instead how various emotional functions have been attributed to specific brain areas via 
observation of behavior—namely “using objective laboratory probes rather than relying 
exclusively [sic] upon self-report data” (ibid). The authors never discuss why it is “tempting 
and often important” to measure subject’s experience; they rapidly dismiss the issue by 
appealing to previous failures of using self-reports.6 Yet as Davidson et al. (2003) 
undoubtedly know, one need not rely exclusively on self-reports to study emotion experience; 
rather data obtained with self-reports can and should be integrated with data about behavior, 
expression, brain activity etc. The question is how to accomplish this integration, and how to 
develop methods for the collection of first-person data that can do more justice to the 
complexity of lived emotion experience than the current “just-take-a-look” attitude. 
 
3 Ideas for an affective neuro-physio-phenomenology 
  
I now want to suggest that taking experience more seriously, and developing methods for a 
                                                
6 In fact, they refer to Kahneman (1999), and only to this paper. This work however is not 
critical of self-reports altogether, but only of retrospective global judgments about one’s 
general affective condition (one of happiness, in this case). Kahneman himself in this paper 
reports the results of a study in which he “beeped” subjects during the day and asked them to 
report on their current state of happiness. This method is precisely the one advocated by those 
who think that it is important to collect first-person data and revive introspection (see 
Hurlburt 2009). 
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more rigorous and systematic exploration of it, can only benefit the neuroscientific (including 
physiological) study of emotion, by helping make progress on some long-standing questions 
on the nature of emotion. In particular in this section I indicate how such an affective 
neurophenomenology (or rather neuro-physio-phenomenology, given the importance of 
psychophysiological measures in the study of emotion) may help address the question of 
whether different emotions are underpinned by unique or distinctive patterns of brain and/or 
bodily activity. In the next section I discuss how it may also address the question of how 
emotion experience, bodily feelings, and actual brain and bodily activity relate to one another.  
 There is currently wide disagreement regarding the first question. Whereas several 
neuroimaging studies have shown that at least some emotions (such as fear, disgust, anger, 
sadness and happiness) activate distinct brain areas, recent meta-analyses have shown that 
these brain areas vary from study to study (see Phan et al. 2002; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith & 
Lawrence 2003; Lindquist et al. 2012). Similarly for autonomic activity. Whereas several 
studies have shown that at least some emotions come with distinct profiles of autonomic 
activity, a meta-analysis by Cacioppo et al. (2000) indicates that these alleged emotion-
specific profiles are in fact not the same across studies. On the basis of these results, some 
emotion theorists (e.g. Barrett 2006) have concluded that emotions are not “natural kinds”—
in the sense that they do not come with distinctive patterns of brain and bodily activity.  This 
conclusion however is controversial and not shared by the authors of the meta-analyses 
themselves. Phan et al. (2002) and Murphy, Nimmo-Smith & Lawrence (2003) interpret the 
results of their analyses as encouraging for the claim that different emotions have distinctive 
neural “signatures.” These results do in fact show some consistency in brain activity for at 
least a few emotions. For example both meta-analyses showed that in a large proportion of the 
studies looking at fear, activation in the amygdala was significant compared to activation in 
other areas; similarly in a large proportion of the studies looking at disgust, activation in the 
basal ganglia was significant compared to activation in other areas (see also Lindquist et al. 
2012). These results are also consistent with neuropsychological evidence from lesion studies 
(see Murphy, Nimmo-Smith & Lawrence 2003). So although the results of the meta-analyses 
are not particularly “clean,” they do not support the radical conclusion that no specificity 
whatsoever can be found for different emotions. One cannot disregard the fact that some 
recurrent activation of the same area, or areas, was found in a high number of studies for more 
than one emotion.7 Whereas it does not seem to be the case that emotions such as fear, 
                                                
7 See also Vytal & Hamann (2010), who used a different statistical method for their meta-
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happiness, sadness, etc. correspond, in a one-to-one way, to individual brain areas, the 
question of whether different emotions reliably engage specific networks or patterns of neural 
activity remains open. Likewise for autonomic activity. A recent and comprehensive meta-
analysis conducted by Kreibig (2010) concluded that there is considerable autonomic 
specificity for different emotions, including not just the standard “basic” ones of happiness, 
sadness, fear, etc. but also shame, embarrassment, jealousy, and more. Although this meta-
analysis only indicates different directions of physiological factors for different emotion 
types, it supports the view that different emotions come in relatively reliable patterns of 
distinctive bodily (here: autonomic) activity.  
 What could neurophenomenology contribute to this debate? My suggestion here is that 
studies of the brain and/or bodily correlates of different emotions may have failed to find 
reliable activation patterns for individual emotions because of a lack of sensitivity to 
variations of the same emotion types. Mainstream affective neuroscience tends to assume that 
fear, anger, happiness etc. refer to distinct “entities,” with no internal variation. Yet there may 
be important differences within the same emotion categories of fear, disgust, sadness, and so 
on. These variations may be manifest in experience, and identifiable with the first- and 
second-person methods mentioned earlier. Experiments could then be set up to verify whether 
thus-identified experiential variations correlate with different and distinctive brain and/or 
bodily patterns.  
 In my experience, fear for example does not come as one and the same type of feeling 
every time I am scared. Language already differentiates between e.g. fear, terror, horror, 
anxiety and worrying, all of which, I would argue, have a “family resemblance” with fear, and 
yet are qualitatively different. In addition, experiences that are commonly referred to as “fear” 
also appear to come in different experiential varieties. Prima facie at least, my fear of a viper 
spotted in the middle of the hiking trail, for example, feels different from my fear before 
giving a talk in front of a critical audience, and differently also from my fear for TV detective 
Sarah Lund as she explores a dark corridor where a dangerous criminal may be waiting. How 
                                                                                                                                                   
analysis, which showed significantly consistent and discriminable patterns of brain activation 
for happiness, sadness, fear, anger and disgust. These patterns overlapped considerably with 
those (partially) identified in the previous meta-analyses. Moreover Vytal & Hamann were 
able to further differentiate between the emotions for which previous meta-analyses could not 
find distinct patterns. 
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exactly these different forms of fear differ from one another however is not easy to say, and it 
is here, I want to suggest, that an experimental investigation into the nature of experience may 
help identify distinctive dimensions of different forms of feelings indicating that the emotion 
category “fear” does not correspond to one static and unchanging entity. It may be that 
different experiential variations come with different brain/bodily patterns, which could at 
least partly explain discrepant results identified so far by meta-analyses. As a more varied, 
context-dependent phenomenon, fear may indeed be underpinned by different patterns of 
brain and/or bodily activity, thus explaining why studies of fear so far have failed to find 
recurrent neurophysiological activations accompanying it (likewise for studies of anger, 
sadness, and so on). As explained above, affective neuroscience typically does not look at 
emotion experience in any detail. As such, it may lack the tools to identify differences in 
emotional responses to stimuli that come with different physical activity. Augmenting 
affective neuroscience with rigorous first- and second-person methods for the generation of 
first-person data may reveal these differences, and contribute to a better understanding of the 
relationship between emotion experiences and their physical bases.  
 
4 The question of the bodily nature of emotion experience  
 
Another long-standing question in affective science regards, broadly speaking, the bodily 
nature of emotion experience. This question has various facets. One regards whether 
experiencing an emotion always necessarily involves experiencing some kind of bodily 
feeling or bodily sensation (in other words, this is a question about the bodily phenomenology 
of emotion experience). William James famously thought so: 
 
[i]f we fancy some strong emotion, and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it 
all the feelings of its characteristic bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left 
behind, no ‘mind-stuff’ out of which the emotion can be constituted … What kind of 
emotion of fear would be left, if the feelings neither of quickened heart-beats nor of 
shallow breathing, neither of trembling lips nor weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh 
nor of visceral stirrings, were present, is quite impossible to think. (James 1884: 193-
194) 
 
According to philosopher Peter Goldie on the other hand, “it surely seems correct to say that 
there are certain sorts of emotion which might have associated feelings, but which do not 
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have associated bodily feelings” (2000: 52, italics in original).8  
 First- and second-person methods could be used to explore these claims more 
systematically and in more detail. It may be that, in the interaction with an interviewer, some 
subjects can become aware of subtle bodily feelings that would otherwise remain unnoted. In 
fact, it seems that some subjects are just not used to paying attention to their body, but that 
with appropriate guidance they can become more sensitive to it (see e.g. Gendlin 1996). 
Perhaps then, with appropriate guidance, “[i]f the reader has never paid attention to this 
matter, he will be both interested and astonished to learn how many different local bodily 
feelings he can detect in himself as characteristic of his various emotional moods” (James 
1884: 192). Yet it might also be possible to identify emotion experiences that are, reportedly, 
not felt as bodily, and to explore their quality in some detail.  
 Also, first- and second-person methods could be used to address a difficulty noted 
already some time ago by Nieuwenhuyse, Offenberg & Frijda (1987) regarding empirical 
studies of the bodily character of emotion experience. Various studies have shown that 
subjects report different bodily sensations for different emotions (e.g. Nieuwenhuyse, 
Offenberg & Frijda 1987; Scherer & Walbott 1994; Philippot & Rimé 1997). Yet it may be 
that participants in these kinds of studies report not what they actually feel, but what they 
expect they should feel on the basis of existing “schemes” or folk psychological assumptions 
of what count as typical bodily feelings for specific emotions (see also Philippot & Rimé 
1997). First- and second-person methods could help here by repeatedly inviting subjects to 
attend to their bodily sensations. Indeed it is a frequent observation in discussions of second-
person methods that subjects initially tend to answer questions about their experience by 
reporting what they think they should be experiencing, rather than what they actually 
experience (see e.g. Gendlin 1996; Petitmengin 2007). My suggestion is that second-person 
methods could help here by redirecting the subjects’ attention, to help them stay focused on 
their actual experience. 
  It would be interesting also to compare the emotion experiences of subjects with 
different levels of expertise in bodily awareness, and/or different training in bodily awareness. 
One such study was conducted already by Sze et al. (2010). They looked at visceral 
awareness (measured in terms of awareness of heart rate) in meditators, dancers, and people 
with no training, and found that meditators (who as part of their practice pay attention to 
                                                
8 See also Heavey, Hurlburt & Lefforge (2012) for evidence that people sometimes report 
bodily feelings in emotion experience, and sometimes do not.  
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breathing and cardiac sensations) reported the highest level of visceral awareness, followed 
by dancers (taken, in this study, usually to rely more on somatic awareness in their practice).9 
It would be interesting to investigate further whether these subjects also differ in terms of the 
reported bodily character of their emotion experiences. Consider also that different dance 
styles cultivate different forms of bodily awareness. Whereas ballet dancers make use of 
mirrors when training, contemporary dancers rely mainly on proprioception; there are even 
dance styles, such as the Japanese Butoh, that require the performers to attend also to their 
interoceptive sensations (see Legrand & Ravn 2009). Do these different training styles and 
practices affect how subjects experience their body in emotion?  
 A second facet of the question of the bodily nature of emotion experience concerns its 
relationship to physical activity, including actual bodily activity (i.e. not just experienced 
bodily sensations). A neuro-physio-phenomenological method would seem to be particularly 
suited to addressing this question. Here, third-person methods could be used to investigate the 
relationship between first-person data, and actual bodily activity. How do reported bodily 
feelings in emotion experience relate to what goes on in the actual body—or, in other words, 
how does the experienced body relate to the physiological body? In some cases, it is easy to 
verify whether a specific bodily feeling “tracks” an actual bodily process. For example, when 
I feel my heart beating fast in fear, I can put a hand on my chest to verify whether what I 
sense interoceptively corresponds to my actual heartbeat; likewise, when I feel my breathing 
becoming shallower in anxiety, I can put a hand on my chest or abdomen. That bodily 
feelings track actual bodily activity in the case of respiration is indicated for example by a 
study by Philippot, Chapelle & Blairy (2002). In a first experiment, they asked subjects to 
self-induce feelings of sadness, anger, fear and happiness by breathing in different ways, and 
to report on the respiration patterns they used. The reported respiration patterns turned out to 
correspond to actual respiration patterns previously measured for those emotions (Boiten, 
Frijda & Wientjes 1994; see also Rainville et al. 2006 for a more recent study). In a second 
                                                
9 Sze et al. also measured cardiac activity in all subjects, and found that in meditators this 
activity correlated most clearly with reported emotion experience (as measured by a rating 
dial). However, rather surprisingly they did not find that reported visceral awareness in 
meditators correlated with cardiac activity—a result they attribute to the inadequacy of their 
self-report inventory for bodily awareness, which did not inquire about actual bodily feelings, 
but about bodily functioning more generally. More rigorous first- and second-person methods 
may help address this kind of shortcomings. 
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experiment, they were able to induce feelings of sadness, anger, fear and happiness by asking 
(other) subjects to breath in those specific ways (without asking them to achieve any specific 
emotional state). Taken together, these results provide evidence that different respiratory 
patterns not only influence emotion experience in specific ways, but are also felt in emotion 
experience, and contribute to its differentiation. 
 Other cases, however, seem trickier. What is going on in the body when people report 
“butterflies in the stomach,” “chills” or “shivers down the spine” in emotion? Are they 
reporting actual bodily changes? If so, what kind of changes? And what about feelings of 
action readiness or urges to act? Or feeling “down” or “up”? Not all bodily feelings are 
feelings of parts of the body that can be obviously identified and measured with third-person 
methods. Vice versa, there are very many changes going on in the body when subjects 
experience an emotion, and not all of them appear to be tracked as such when subjects report 
bodily feelings—although they may influence emotion experience nevertheless (as in the case 
of changes in glucose and hormonal levels). Note that some studies just assume that bodily 
concomitants in emotion experience can be studied merely by asking subjects how they feel 
their body, without carrying out any actual bodily measurement. Scherer & Wallbott (1994), 
for example, addressed the vexed question of whether at least some emotions exhibit the same 
patterns of physiological activity across cultures merely by asking subjects from different 
countries, with various questionnaires, how they felt their body during emotion experience. 
Likewise, Grewe et al. (2007) studied “physiological responses” to music with questionnaires 
asking subjects to “report their perceived bodily reactions” (779; see also Sloboda 1991). 
Most philosophical discussions also assume that bodily feelings in emotion experience 
register what is in fact happening in the body. Yet how the lived body and the physiological 
body relate to one another is an empirical question, and needs to be addressed as such.  
 Addressing this question could also help understand whether differences between 
emotion experiences that are reported as bodily, and emotion experiences that are not reported 
as bodily (as established with first- and second-person methods), correlate with differences in 
actual bodily activity—or whether they depend rather on differences in bodily self-awareness, 
such as e.g. interoceptive awareness. There is evidence already that some subjects are better 
than others at perceiving their bodies, as measured (so far) in terms of perception of their own 
heartbeat (e.g. Craig 2002);10 and that differences in interoceptive awareness correlate with 
                                                
10 In these experiments, subjects are asked to count their perceived heartbeats silently 
(without feeling for their pulse), or to evaluate whether their heartbeats are synchronous with 
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differences in emotion experience, such as anxiety (Critchley et al. 2004). It may turn out that 
whereas different emotion experiences involve specific changes in the body, subjects are not 
equally good at detecting these changes, and therefore some subjects experience emotion as 
“less bodily” than others. Relatedly, it would be interesting to find out whether subjects can 
be trained via biofeedback to detect their body more accurately, and whether this training 
influences their emotion experience in terms of “how bodily” it feels.  
 Additional relevant first- and third-person data could be gathered from subjects with a 
variety of bodily impairments, to understand whether and how these affect emotion 
experience and its bodily character, and how reported bodily feelings (if any) relate to the 
condition of the body. For example, do subjects with spinal cord injuries experience emotion 
and, if so, do these emotion experiences include bodily feelings? If they do include bodily 
feelings, what kinds of feelings are they? Are they visceral sensations? Are they rather 
kinesthetic feelings, such as urges to move or even act in specific ways? How and where in 
the body are these feelings experienced? Existing evidence about the extent to which spinal 
cord lesions impair emotion experience is mixed (e.g. Hohmann 1966; Chwalisz, Diener & 
Gallagher 1988; Montoya & Schandry 1994; Cobos et al. 2002; O’Carroll et al. 2003; Nicotra 
et al. 2006). Yet the other questions, to the best of my knowledge, have not been explored 
systematically, with the first- and second-person methods recommended by 
neurophenomenology. Even if people with spinal injuries retain emotion experiences, it may 
be that these have a different or attenuated bodily character, compared to the emotions 
experienced before the lesion. Further questions could then be raised about the relation 
between experience and condition of the body. Spinal cord lesions can impair the capacity to 
move various muscles, proprioception, the generation of sympathetic and parasympathetic 
responses as well as sensory feedback from the viscera. The type and degree of impairment 
can vary considerably depending on the location and nature of the injury. A neuro-physio-
phenomenological approach might enable us better to understand the relationship between the 
nature of the lesion and the subjects’ experience, and in particular whether and how different 
aspects of bodily arousal contribute to emotion experience.  
 A similar approach could be taken towards other conditions, such as pure autonomic 
failure (which involves a peripheral degeneration of sympathetic and parasympathetic 
autonomic neurons), Möbius syndrome (which entails a congenital total paralysis of facial 
                                                                                                                                                   
tones triggered by the heartbeats themselves, with varying delays (see for example Critchley 
et al. 2004). 
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muscles), and locked-in syndrome (which involves a paralysis of all voluntary muscles apart 
from those responsible for vertical movement of the eyes, and blinking). We know from 
autobiographies of locked-in patients (painfully dictated letter by letter through blinking) that 
they retain bodily sensations, as well as a variety of more or less intense emotion experiences 
(see Bauby 1997; Chisholm & Gillet 2005). What is the quality of the latter however?11 
 Third-person methods could focus not just on the body but on the brain as well. Which 
areas of the brain activate significantly when people report bodily emotion experiences? Are 
they different from the brain areas that activate significantly for reportedly non-bodily 
emotion experiences? Existing evidence indicates that the anterior insula (also known as 
“insular cortex”) for example is significantly involved in registering bodily activity and 
contributing to interoceptive feelings (Craig 2002; Critchley et al. 2004). It would be 
interesting then to see whether emotion experiences that reportedly involve bodily feelings 
correlate with activity in this area more than emotion experiences that reportedly do not 
involve bodily feelings. Damasio et al. (2000) notably showed that self-induced experiences 
of happiness, sadness, fear and anger correlate with activity in brain structures involved in the 
regulation of the organism, in particular that receive signals from the internal milieu, viscera 
and musculoskeletal system (such as insula, secondary somatosensory cortex, and cingulate 
cortex); moreover they found that those four emotion experiences correlate with different 
patterns of neural activity in these areas. Yet we do not know from this study how the subjects 
experienced those emotions, and in particular whether they felt them as bodily. A more recent 
study that looked at how experience, body and brain all correlate with one another is Harrison 
et al. (2010). This study illustrates well the possibility of correlating first- and third-person 
data of various kinds in the study of emotion experience, and thus comes quite close to a 
neuro-physio-phenomenological methodology (although more attention still could be paid to 
first- and second-person methods).  
                                                
11 Of course a variety of ethical and practical considerations makes this kind of inquiry 
particularly difficult. See also Topulos, Lansing & Banzett (1993) for a study in which 
healthy, unsedated subjects (for ethical reasons, these were the experimenters themselves) 
willingly underwent a complete neuromuscular blockade. They reported experiencing 
emotions such as fear and panic, but it remains unclear from the paper whether the blockade 
interrupted visceral feedback and, again, whether the subjects experienced their emotions as 
“bodily” (and if so, in which sense). 
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 Harrison et al. looked at two forms of disgust—“core ingestive disgust,” induced by 
watching movies of people vomiting when smelling and eating visually repulsive food, and 
“body-boundary-violation disgust,” induced by watching movies of surgical operations. After 
the presentation of each movie, subjects had to indicate respectively, on analog scales, how 
disgusted, light-headed/faint, and nauseated they felt. Harrison et al. found that subjects 
reported feeling more nauseated in the “core disgust” condition (intensity of disgust and light-
headedness were not significantly different). In addition, they found different physiological 
patterns (as measured in terms of cardiac and gastric activity) for the two forms of disgust, 
and interestingly found that core disgust was accompanied by greater tachygastric responses 
(that is, rapid disregulated gastric responses). They also found that the two forms of disgust 
correlated with differential patterns of insula activation. Thus compared to Damasio et al.’s 
(2000), this study shows that different patterns of activity in insular cortex accompany not 
just different emotion experiences, but also different bodily feelings experienced as part of 
them; in addition, it shows how these bodily feelings correlate with actual bodily activity.  
 Finally, neuro-physio-phenomenology could be used to understand the extent to which 
(if at all) neural activity can “bypass” bodily activity and induce bodily feelings “as if” the 
body were undergoing specific changes. In a footnote, James (1884) already mentioned the 
possibility of “morbid fear in which objectively the heart is not much perturbed” (199), and 
pointed out that these cases needed to be better documented and studied:  
 
it is of course possible that the cortical centres normally percipient of dread as a 
complex of cardiac and other organic sensations due to real bodily change, should 
become primarily excited in brain-disease, and give rise to an hallucination of the 
changes being there,—an hallucination of dread, consequently, coexistent with a 
comparatively calm pulse, &c. I say it is possible, for I am ignorant of observations 
which might test the fact. (199-200, emphasis in original) 
 
Damasio (1994: 155-160) also discusses this possibility to some extent, calling the brain areas 
allegedly bypassing the body “as-if” body loops.  
 Not only however there is no direct evidence that as-if body loops exist (including 
how long an as-if body experience could last without registering inputs from the actual body, 
or how it would feel), but the more we understand the complexity of how brain and body are 
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related, the more suspect the notion becomes.12 Brain and body continuously influence one 
another in innumerable ways (Pert 1997; Cosmelli & Thompson 2010; Thompson & 
Cosmelli, in press). There are in particular very many channels through which the body 
“informs” the brain about its status, and there is no evidence that they can all be “bypassed” 
and “simulated” by neural activity. Somatic information is conveyed via the spinal nerves and 
the trigeminal nerve; visceral information is conveyed via the spinal nerves, but also the 
vagus nerve and the glossopharingeal nerve (two cranial nerves). There are also very many 
brain regions that register bodily activity: somatic information is registered in brainstem 
nuclei, thalamus and primary and secondary somatic sensory cortex (SI and SII) and parietal 
areas (Purves et al. 2008, chapter 9). As for visceral information, key areas are the nucleus of 
the solitary tract, the brainstem reticular formation and the hypothalamus. The brainstem also 
contains areas that register circulating humoral signals; these are known as “sensory 
circumventricular organs” and are situated at the blood-brain interface, such as the area 
postrema, the organum vasculosum of the lamina terminalis, and the subfornical organ (see 
Price, Hoyda, & Ferguson 2008; for an overview of the visceral system, see Purves et al. 
2008, chapter 21; see Parvizi & Damasio 2001 for a discussion of the many nuclei of the 
brainstem).  
 It seems highly unlikely that the brain could bypass and simulate all this activity. As 
Damasio (1994: 158) himself originally emphasized,  
 
the brain is not likely to predict how all the commands—neural and chemical, but 
especially the latter—will play out in the body, because the play-out and the resulting 
                                                
12 In his more recent book Damasio (2010: 102) admits that the notion of as-if body loop as 
he originally proposed it had only “circumstantial evidence.” He claims however that such 
evidence has now been found, in particular he refers to evidence for the existence of motor 
mirror neurons, which fire when one observes someone else perform a goal-oriented action 
“as if” the observer were herself performing that action: “[s]o-called mirror neurons are, in 
effect, the ultimate as-if body device” (op. cit., 103). Yet note that evidence for the existence 
of mirror neurons is not evidence for the existence of brain systems that “bypass” one’s own 
body and that, as they do so, simulate an experience. There is no evidence of what human 
subjects experience when they see another’s action or expression, and their mirror system 
activates. Arguably when I see another person perform a goal-oriented action, I do not feel 
“as if” I was the one performing the action. 
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states depend on local biochemical contexts and on numerous variables within the 
body itself which are not fully represented neurally. What is played out in the body is 
constructed anew, moment by moment, and is not an exact replica of anything that 
happened before.  
 
In addition Damasio himself does not believe either that the experience underpinned by 
alleged as-if body loops would feel like one that involves actual bodily loops (see Damasio 
1994: 156; 2010: 121).  
 In sum then, it looks like there are many ways in which a neuro-physio-
phenomenological approach could be used specifically to investigate the relationship between 
emotion experience and the body. First- and second-person methods could be used to 
investigate the phenomenological or lived bodily character of emotion experience; third-
person methods could be added to explore the relationship between reported lived experience, 
and bodily and brain activity, which could help us to understand how reported bodily feelings, 
as well as reportedly non-bodily emotion experiences, relate to actual brain and/or bodily 
processes. This method would enable affective scientists to address the question of the bodily 
nature of emotion experience at various levels, and in a more sophisticated way than current 
approaches.  
 
Conclusion 
  
I have argued that the current affective neuroscientific approach would benefit from being 
augmented with the methodology recommended by neurophenomenology. At the moment, 
affective neuroscience tends to minimize its reliance on first-person data. However, I have 
proposed, developing adequate first- and second-person methods for the generation of first-
person data, in the way neurophenomenology suggests, could help answer long-standing 
questions about the nature of emotion. For example, it could help answer the question of 
whether different emotions reliably come with unique, distinctive patterns of brain and/or 
bodily activity. Evidence so far is inconclusive, but I have argued that a problem with the 
studies conducted so far is that they did not consider the possibility that emotions such as 
fear, anger, sadness, and so on, come in variations, each of which has its own pattern of 
physical activity. These variations may be manifest in experience, and revealed with careful 
first- and second-person investigations. A neurophenomenological (or better neuro-physio-
phenomenological) method could also enable a sophisticated approach to the question of the 
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bodily nature of emotion experience. First- and second-person methods could be used to 
explore the extent to which subject report bodily feelings when they experience emotions, and 
these reports could then be compared with third-person data about brain and/or bodily 
activity, to help understand whether and how lived experience relates to the living organism.  
Importantly, augmenting affective neuroscience in the ways suggested here would not 
only enrich current scientific methods for the study of emotion, but also benefit the 
neurophenomenological project itself, by extending it to the domain of emotion. This would 
have the additional benefit of making neurophenomenology more clearly an enterprise aimed 
at understanding the relationship between experience and the whole organism, rather than the 
brain only. Neurophenomenological studies so far have focused on the relationship between 
experience and brain activity. Affective neuroscience on its part in the last few years has 
developed several sophisticated and increasingly less intrusive methods for the measurement 
of bodily activity. Extending neurophenomenology to the study of emotion would thus extend 
it to the rest of the organism, more in line with the “enactive” approach that Varela himself 
favoured, and of which neurophenomenology is an offshoot.  
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